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ABSTRACT
This note explores the sensitivity of the short-run savings effects of
government deficits to assumptions about household planning horizons. Using a
lifecycle simulation model, we show that even though deficit policies shift
sizable tax burdens to future generations, individuals live long enough to make
the assumption of an infinite horizon a good approximation for analyzing the
short—run savings effects. In practice, periods of debt accumulation such as
that in the United States during World War II are reversed sufficiently rapidly
to make their short—run effects on consumption and national savings relatively
small.
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(617) 253—6673 (617) 495—2441At least since Ricardo, economists have wrestled with the dual questions
of whether or not government bonds represent net wealth, and whether govern-
ment deficits affect national savings. The answers are far from obvious. James
Tobin (1952) asked rhetorically, "How is it possible that society merely by the
device of incurring a debt to itself can deceive itself into believing that it
is wealthier? Do not the additional taxes which are necessary to carry the
interest charges reduce the value of other components of private wealth? There
must certainly be effects in this direction." While Tobin (1980) concluded
these effects are small, the economic effects of government indebtedness remain
controversial,
The argument that government debt does not represent net wealth may be
stated simply. While government bonds represent an asset to those holding them,
they represent a liability to taxpayers who must ultimately redeem them. These
assets and liabilities exactly offset each other; barring distributional effects
the existence of government debt should not affect total spending. A major
counter-argument, developed by Modigliani (1961) and Diamond (1965) among others,
suggests that debt does represent net wealth to the extent that the asset of
present generations is offset by a liability of unborn future generations.
Robert Barro (1974) challenged this counter-argument by suggesting that any
burdens shifted to future generations may be offset by intergenerational trans-
fers. His article spawned a continuing debate on the so-called Ricardian
equivalence proposition. A substantial part of this debate has centered on
intergenerational economic linkages; whether transfer motives give consumers
effectively infinite horizons has been seen as a critical issue. The implicit
assumption in this debate has been that if appropriate linkages do not exist,—2—
then debt burdens can be shifted to futuregenerations and government deficits
affect national savings.
-
Thisnote examines the quantitative importance of intergenerationallink-
ages for analyzing the short-run effects of govirnment deficitson national
savings. The view that deficits significantly alter nationalsavings lies
behind the frequent assertions that they crowd outinvestment and reduce inter-
national competitiveness. Our purpose is not to evaluatethese claims, but
rather to explore the limited question of whetheror not the intergenerational
transfers induced by deficits, taken alone, are sufficientto justify them.
Our conclusion is that while deficit policies like thosethe United States
has historically followed shift substantial taxburdens to future generations,
this effect is not large enough to significantly alternational savings in the
short run. The extent and nature of bequest motivesare therefore of secondary
importance for judging whether deficits have short—runcrowding out effects,
even though they are primary determinants of the'ong—run effects of deficits.
This note is divided into three sections. The firstuses a stylized
lifecycle simulation model to show that actual human lifetimesare long enough
so that for purposes of analyzing the short-run effects offiscal policies,
they can be approximated as infinite. This is trueeven though deficits can
have a potentially large impact on long-runcapital intensity. Section II
reviews the U.S. experience on debtrepayment policy, a critical factor in ana-
lyzing the long-run effects of these policies. We focuson World War II and
show that roughly two-thirds of the war debtwas repaid within the lifetimes of
persons in the working population during the war. There isa brief conclusion.—3—
I. Deficit Policy in Lifecycle Models
We use a lifecycle model to compute the net wealth effects of the govern-
ment debt accumulated during deficit periods, and to calculate the short-run
effect of deficits on national savings.1 We assume that agents work for the
first 1' years of their lives, and then retire for the final I -1'years. In
our calculations, T =55and T' =45.
The government can finance expenditures either by levying taxes or by issu-
ing debt. We consider deficit policies which, for K years, transfer one dollar
to each living person.2 The government finances these expenditures with debt,
and beginning in year K + 1, it levies lump-sum taxes on working individuals to
meet its interest payments and maintain a target debt level.3The assumption
that taxes are levied only on those who are still in the labor force is ex-
tremely generous to the view that models with finite lifetimes yield different
results about national savings than models with infinite horizons, since it
strengthens the positive relationship between an individual's marginal propen-
sity to consume and his net wealth increment from the deficit policy.
We consider two possible government debt targets: one holds constant the
real debt stock, while the other holds constant the real debt stock per capita.
For each repayment policy, we compute the deficit's net wealth increment for a
person of age a, designated dW(a) and dW'(a) in the constant real debt and con-
stant real per capita debt cases, respectively.
For individuals who are retired when the government begins a period of
deficit finance (a > 1') or who will be retired when it begins to levy the taxes
to finance the deficit (a > V -K),the repayment policy does not affect their
net wealth increment:r aT-K
dW(a) =dW'(a)=
(1)
i_erK 1' -KaT- K.
For younger agents, the repayment policy does matter. Theirnet wealth incre-
ments are given by:
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The aggregate wealth effect of a deficit policy isa weighted average of
the wealth effects in (1) and (2), with weightsequal to the population shares
of the different age cohorts. Tablet reports theaggregate wealth increments
associated with a one—year deficit policy. If all of the taxes usedto finance
the deficit were levied after the transfer recipients haddied, the entries in
the table would be 1.0. The results suggest that for the two debtrepayment
policies we consider, the present value of the associated taxpayments are sub-
stantially less than half of the initial transfer. In economies with apopula-
tion growth rate of one percent, a one dollar transfer followedby a constant
real debt policy raises net wealth by anaverage of 85 cents if the real inter-
est rate is .01, by 65 cents if r=.03, andby 53 cents i-f r=.0S. If the govern-
ment targets real debt per capita, then the net wealth effects forthese three—5—
real interest rates are 100 cents, 77 cents, and 63 cents, respectively. These
results, along with similar calculations for other parameter values, suggest
that deficit policies may transfer substantial tax burdens to future generations.
To analyze whether these wealth transfers are accompanied by substantial
crowding out of contemporaneous investment, however, we must consider the asso-
ciated changes in national savings. We do this assuming that agents maximize
additively separable constant—elasticity utility functions
V(a) =f[c(t)T/y] e_t_dt (3)
where & is the time preference rate, subject to the standard life—cycle budget
constraint,
W(a) =c(t)e_r(t dt (4)
where W(a) is age-a person's wealth. For this specification of preferences, the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is (0 -r)/(e°"T-1),
where 0 =(r—6)/(1-y)is the agent's consumption growth rate. Since agents of
different ages have different marginal propensities to consume, the age distri-
bution plays an important part in determining the short-run consumption effects
of deficit policies. We calculate the aggregate consumption effect by multi-
plying each cohort's wealth increment, computed as in (1) and (2), by its margi-
nal propsensity to consume and weighting the resulting consumption changes by
population shares.
The first column of Table 2 shows the per capita consumption changes asso-
ciated with a one year, one dollar per capita deficit policy. With a real
interest rate of .03, a population growth rate of .01, and a consumption growth-6-
rate of .03, per capita consumption spending rises by either 6.1 or 6.5cents,
depending upon the debt repayment policy. A more realistic fiveyear deficit
policy raises consumption by only 22 cents assuming the same parameter values.
Although the choice of parameter values and whtchdebt repayment policy the
government pursues can affect the short-run consumption -change by one or two
cents, these choices do not alter the general conclusion that deficits lead to
trivial changes in consumption spending.
These results are very similar to those which would obtain in an infinite-
horizon model. With stationary population, an infinite—livedagent would not
change his consumption at all in response to the deficit policies we have con-
sidered. With population growth, however, the current generation does benefit
through its ability to share future taxes with as yet unborn generations. For
the parameter values we have chosen, this effect-Would lead to roughlya one
cent increase in consumption by an infinite-lived consumer.
The central feature of the lifecycle model which explains our small short—
run consumption effects is that for all but the oldest consumers, the marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth is relative1y small. Even if the government
provided transfer payments to all currently living agents and financed them with
taxes levied after the youngest members of the current generation died, the
upper bound on the short—run consumption effect would be the population—weighted
average of marginal propensities to consume. Assuming the real interest rate is
three percent, this weighted average is .082 when n=.O1 and 0 =.01,and .072





Itis essential to recognize that we have focused on the short—runsavings—1—
effects of government deficits. To evaluate their long—run capital intensity
effects, we must account for the legacy of increased debt which remains even
after the budget is balanced. Absent altruistic bequest motives, this debt
raises household wealth, increases consumption, and decreases savings. Although
in any given year these savings effects may be small, they cumulate over time.
Simulation results presented in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1986) suggest that defi-
cits may have sizable effects on the long—run capital stock. Future research
should explore these long run effects in greater detail.
II. Evaluating Historical Debt Repayment Experience
Throughout our simulation exercises, we have assumed that the government
never repays the debt principal. This biases our short—run consumption effects
upwards, and generates a larger wealth increment from deficits, than more
realistic repayment policies might suggest. In practice, periods of rapid debt
accumulation tend to be followed by debt repayment.
Actual repayment experience is illustrated in Table 3, which shows the path
of real debt per capita after three wars which were financed with heavy govern-
ment borrowing.4 Real debt per capita fell by nearly 47 percent in the two
decades following the Civil War, and by 57 percent during a similar period after
World War II. The experience after World War I is clouded by the onset of the
Great Depression only ten years afterwards. In 1929, however, the real debt
stock per capita had fallen forty-five percent relative to its level in 1919.
The deflation of the 1930s, coupled with debt—financed fiscal policy, led to a
pronounced increase in the real debt stock and by 1939, real debt per capita was—8-
over thirty percent greater than it was in 1919. Nonetheless, itseems reason-
able to regard the Depression period as something of an outlier andto conclude
from these data that repayment following debt growth is oftenquite rapid.
We illustrate this point by considering the aftermath of World War II in
more detail. We calculate the fraction of the war debt which individuals of
different ages in 1945 would have expected to repay if they hadanticipated the
path of real deficits over the next thirty years.5 For eachyear between 1946
and 1970, we compute the per capita change in the real debtoutstanding, Abt.
We compute the expected present value of these repayments, viewed from1945,
using survival probabilities drawn from the 1950 U.S. life table and discounting
the sequence of expected repayments using the path of realized realTreasury
bill rates. The expected present value of debt repayments for anage—a indivi—
1970
dual in 1945 is therefore dW(a) = S(a,i)R(i)Ab. where S(a,t) denotes the
i=1946
probability that an individual of age a in 1945 would still be alive inyear t
and R(i) is the i—year discount factor viewed from the perspective of 1945.
The results of this calculation are shown in the first column of Table 4.
An individual aged twenty at the end of the war couldexpect to repay 72.9 per-
cent of the war debt within his lifetime.6 This fraction is relatively insen-
sitive to the individual's age. For a fifty year old, the expectedrepayment
fraction was 67.0 percent. An individual would have to have been at least75
years old in 1945 to expect to escape half of the war debt repayments, and even
an eighty-year-old could expect to repay 43.3 percent of the war debt. On
average, one additional dollar of debt at the end of the war constituted only a
thirty—two cent increment to net wealth. This is less than half as largeas the-9.-
estimates suggested by our calculations in the last section.
To illustrate how wartime debt accumulation may have influenced consumption
and savings, the second column in Table 4 reports the change in consumption
which would have resulted if the United States government had repudiated its war
debts in 1946. The consumption effects, measured in 1912 dollars, range from a
decrease of $18.86 for twenty year olds, to a fall of $115.34 for persons aged
seventy, to a consumption drop of over three hundred dollars for an eighty-year-
old. The aggregate reduction in per capita consumption, however, would only
have been about $40. By comparison, per capita consumption in 1946 was $2604
dollars; even a dramatic policy such as debt repudiation would therefore have
caused only a 1.5 percent decline in aggregate consumption under the maintained
lifecycle hypothesis. These results suggest that the short-run savings effects
of government deficits are therefore even smaller than indicated by our simula-
tion results in the last section.
III. Conclusion
Our calculations suggest that for analyzing the short-run savings effects
of government deficits, little of substance hangs on the presence or absence of
intergenerational linkages. In the absence of population growth, an infinite
lived consumer would not change his consumption at all in response to a govern-
ment deficit. In realistic lifecycle models, we find that each dollar of
government deficit will raise household consumption by roughly five cents. The
distinction between finite and infinite horizon models, which has been stressed
in much of the Ricardian equivalence debate, is therefore of little empirical—10—
importance for analyzing the short-run savings effects ofbudget deficits.
While the ability of debtpolicies to shift taxburdens to future gener-
ations does not justify a conclusion that deficits havea significant short-run
impact on national savings, there exist a number of otherarguments supporting
this conclusion. First, tax cutsmay portend future spending reductions because
of the political response to deficits or taxsmoothing as suggested by Barro
(1979). Consumers who internalize the government'sbudget constraint will then
feel richer and reduce their saving. This implies thateven proponents of
Ricardian equivalence should regard current fiscalpolicies as having poten-
tially important effects on national savings. Second, alarge body of evidence
suggests -the excess sensitivity of consumption to income changes. Ifthis
reflects liquidity constraints or consumer myopia, thencurrent tax reductions
financed by future tax increases are likely to raiseconsumption. Third, actual
taxes are not lump sum levies. Barsky, Mankiw, -and Zeldes(1985) argue that
deficit policies may raise consumption becausethey reduce the precautionary
demand for savings. In practice, the taxchanges associated with deficits may
give rise to intertemporai substitution effects of thetype studied in Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1986). Future work should concentrateon measuring the empirical.
significance of these and other channels linking deficits andnational savings.—11—
FOOTNOTES
1.Similar experiments could be performed in Blanchard's (1985) finite
horizon model.
2. Our calculations assume that the primary deficit rises by one dollar
each year for each living person. This corresponds to an even larger change in
the measured deficit in our multi-year experiments, since the interest payments
on debt incurred in the first few years of the policy must also be financed by
borrowing.
3. We assume that these taxes have no effect on labor force participation
decisions.
4. Detailed information on the measurement and behavior of real government
debt in both the U.S. and the U.K. may be found in Barro (1984).
5. Our calculations ignore a number of other policy changes in the post—war
period which have induced substantial intergenerational transfers. The most
important of these is the liberalization of Social Security benefits, a reform
which had it been anticipated in 1945 would have raised the wealth increment
for that generation.
6. We assume that all debt repayments were applied to the accumulated war
debt, biasing our conclusion toward the finding that debt repayment was rapid.
War debt accounted for 74.5 percent of the outstanding real debt in 1945. If we
assumed that outstanding debts of all vintages were paid off proportionately
after the war, our calculations in Table 4 would show that expected debt
repayments equalled .504 of the war-time borrowing.
7. We assume that all debt is domestically held. This exaggerates our
estimates of how repudiation affects consumption, since actual repudiation would
also effect a transfer from foreign debt holders to U.S. citizens.—12—
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Table 1: Fraction of Deficit-Induced Government Debt which is NetWealth
Parameter Debt Concept Fraction of Debt
Values Held Constant which is Net Wealth
r=.01 Real 0.850
n=.01 Real Per Capita i.ooo
r=.03 Real 0.651
n=.01 Real Per Capita 0.767
r=.03 Real 0.666
n=.02 Real Per Capita 0.888
r=.05 Real D.531.
n=.O1 Real Per Capita 0.625
r=.05 Real 0.546
n=.02 Real Per Capita 0.727
Notes: All calculations assume that each household lives for 55 periods and
works for the first 45 periods. The real interest rate is r, while n
is the population growth rate.
A—14—
Table 2: Short—Run Effects of Deficit Policies in Lifecycle Model
Consumption Change/Deficit
Debt Concept
Parameter Values Held Constant One Year Deficit Five Year Deficit
r=.0j, n=.01, Real 0.067 0.246
O=.O1 Real Per Capita b.oii 0.262
r=.01. n=.0j, Real 0.060 0.212
O=.03 Real Per Capita 0.063 0.222
r=.03, n=.01, Real 0.068 0.248
B=.O1 Real Per Capita 0.072 0.266
r=.03, n=.0j, Real 0.061 0.217
8=.03 Real Per Capita 0.065 0.229
r=.03, n=.02, Real 0.058 0.223
O=.01 Real Per Capita 0.066 0.256
r=.03, n=.02, Real 0.051 0.190
O=.03 Real Per Capita 0.057 0.213
r=.05, n=.01, Real 0.068 0.247
e=.oi Real Per Capita 0.073 0.268
r=.05, n=.01, Real 0.063 0.221
9=•Q3 Real Per Capita 0.066 0.235
r=.05, n=.02, Real 0.059 0.221
Real Per Capita 0.068 0.263
r=.05, n=.02, Real 0.053 0.197
8.03 Real Per Capita 0.060 0.223
Notes: All calculations assume that each household lives for 55 periods and
works for the first 45 periods. Deficits are financed using lump sum
taxes on all working individuals; see text for further details.—15—
Table 3: Movements in Real Debt Per CapitaFollowing Major Wars
Percentage Change in Real Debt Per Capita After:
Episode 5 Years 10 Years is Years 20 Years
Civil War —o.i —17.1 —17.2 —46.6
World War I —23.7 —44.5 +2.0 +36.7
World War II —36.7 —44.8 —52.6 —56.9
Notes: Data on outstanding stock of publicly—heldinterest-bearing federal debt
are drawn from Historical Statistics of the United States and the
Federal Reserve Bulletin. The population measure isnumber of persons
aged 16-plus, again drawn from Historical Statistics. Theprice level
is the personal consumption deflator for the World War IIepisode, the
all-commodities Consumer Price Index for World War 1, and theWarren-
Pearson Wholesale Price Index for the Civil War.
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Table 4: Burden of Actual Post—World War II Debt Repayments
Expected Present Value of tax Repayments Repudiation Effect










Notes: All calculations are based on the actual path of real deficits, 1945-
1970, and mortality probabilities based on the 1949-1951 Life Tables for
the United States. Consumption changes in the last column are in 1912
dollars.